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Abstract. In this paper we consider a mean field approach to modeling the
agents flow over a transportation network. In particular, beside a standard
framework of mean field games, with controlled dynamics by the agents and
costs mass-distribution dependent, we also consider a path preferences dynam-
ics obtained as a generalization of the so-called noisy best response dynamics.
Such a preferences dynamics says the agents choose their path having access
to global information about the network congestion state and based on the
observation of the decision of the agents that have preceded. We prove the
existence of a mean field equilibrium obtained as a fixed point of a map over
a suitable set of time-varying mass-distributions, defined edge by edge in the
network. We also address the case where the admissible set of controls is
suitably bounded depending on the mass-distribution on the edge itself.
1. Introduction. In this paper, we introduce a Mean Field approach to modeling
and analytically studying the agents flow over a transportation network.
We frame our work in the literature on the flow dynamics of agents, which have
become in the last decades of interest for several research communities. In the
transportation area, for example, the interest towards such topics is due to the
continuous growth of traffic flow as well as the spread of information and commu-
nication technologies which are changing the transportation system dynamics and
affecting the users’ decision making and behaviors. Different modeling approaches
have been proposed which can generally be classified into three categories: micro-
scopic, macroscopic and multi-scale models. The microscopic models or “individual
based models”, describe the crowd by giving the dynamics of each agent, usually
via an ordinary differential equation and are particularly well suited for use with
small crowds. Such approach includes the cellular automaton model (see e.g., [8]),
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the lattice gas model (see e.g. [17]) and the social force model considered in [18].
Specifically, in [18], the authors introduce the concept of social force to measure the
internal motivation of the individuals in performing certain movements. Another
microscopic description is provided in [19]–[20], where a theory of pedestrian route
choice behavior based on the concepts of walking task and walking cost is proposed.
Each pedestrian plans her movements on the basis of some predictions she makes
on the other individuals’ behavior. She makes her decisions by minimizing her
individually estimated walking cost, expressed by a functional depending on the
predicted positions of other people.
Macroscopic models, in contrast, focus on the overall behavior of pedestrian flows
and are more suited to investigations of extremely large crowds, especially when
examining aspects of motion in which individual differences are less important.
Such models describe the evolution of the population’s density through a partial
differential equation, often of transport type. In [22] the crowds is treated as a
“thinking fluid” and the model is described by the continuity equation coupled with
the eikonal equation. In [7], instead, the continuity equation is linked to the linear
momentum one. Both models are based one the concepts of preferred direction of
motion and discomfort at high densities. In the framework of scalar conservation
laws, a macroscopic one-dimensional model has been proposed in [11] with the aim
of describing the transition from normal to panic conditions. Finally, in [27] a
new model of pedestrian flow, formulated within a measure-theoretic framework is
proposed. It consists of a representation of the system via a family of measures
which provide an estimate of the space occupancy by pedestrians at successive
times.
The multi-scale models use measure evolution equations for describing crowds
mixing a microscopic and a macroscopic description. In particular, the time evolv-
ing measure allow to split the density into a microscopic granular and a macroscopic
continuous mass. These kinds of multi-scale models were introduced quite recently
for crowd and pedestrian dynamics modeling (see [13]–[14], [28]–[29]) and enjoy the
following properties. They are able to capture some typical phenomena such as
self organization. Their different scales can be used to model the relative impor-
tance of agents in a crowd: for example, in a leader-follower system, leaders are
described by a precise microscopic model, while followers are taken into account by
the macroscopic part.
In [3], [4] a mean field game approach is implemented for studying the opti-
mal behavior of agents flowing on a network having more than one target (vertices
of the networks) to be reached (visited). In [5] an origin-destination model with
path preferences dynamics as the one here presented is preliminary treated. In the
present paper, starting from the similar analysis of the different problem in [4], and
generalizing the results in [5], beside the usual framing of mean field games (typi-
cally defined by the pair made of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and mass conservation
equations), we also consider the agent’s path preferences dynamics. Specifically,
we propose a model in which the agents choose their path having access to global
information about the network congestion, but also being influenced by the decision
of agents that has already made their decisions.
Then, our model consider two dynamics: the first one based on the mass con-
servation equations describes the real time evolution of the congestion level in each
edge of the network; the second one involves the evolution of the agents’ path pref-
erences. It is related to the agents’ experiences and the available information. It
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evolves at a slow time scale as compared to the first one.
One possible physical interpretation of our model is to consider the agents as pedes-
trians traversing possible paths within a city described as a network. However, it
may also seen as well suited to describe, for example, car traffic flow in highways
networks. In this way, the model can be related to two streams of literature on
transportation networks. On the one hand, pedestrians flows on networks have been
widely analysed using the different modeling approaches cited above. As compared
to the macroscopic and multi-scale approaches (typically described by partial dif-
ferential equations), ours significantly simplifies the evolution of the traffic masses
(using a balance ordinary differential equations), whereas it highlights the role of
agents route choice behavior which is typically neglected in that literature. On the
other hand, transportation networks have been studied from a decision theoretic
perspective within the framework of congestion games [6], [30]. In this framework,
however, the information is available to the agents at a single temporal and spatial
scale and the mass conservation equations are completely neglected by assuming
that they are instantaneously equilibrated. In contrast, we study a model where
the mass conservation equations are not neglected and agents route choice decisions
are affected both by the global information on the congestion and by the decision
of the agents that have preceded entering the network.
As already mentioned our models is based on Mean field games (MFG), whose
theory goes back to the seminal work by Lasry-Lions [23] (see also [21]). This theory
includes methods and techniques to study differential games with a large population
of rational players and it is based on the assumption that the population influences
individuals’ strategies through mean field parameters. Several application domains
such as economics, physics, biology and network engineering accommodate MFG
theoretical models (see [1], [16], [24]–[25]). In particular, models to study of dy-
namics on networks and/or pedestrian movement can be found for example in [9],
[15], [10], [2].
Beside the position of the problem, which is also rather new, the main goal of the
present paper is to prove the existence of a mean field equilibrium for our framework.
This equilibrium is a time-varying distribution of agents ρ, defined edge by edge
in the network, that generates an optimal controls vector which, in turn, yields a
path preference vector providing once again the time-varying distribution ρ. It is
obtained as a fixed point of a map which satisfies the conditions of the Brouwer
fixed-point theorem. In out model, the controls implemented by an agent can be
interpreted as the the velocities at which the agent traverses the network edges.
Then, we also address the case where a mass-distribution dependent bound on the
set of admissible controls is assumed, in order to take account of possible constraints
in the velocities when edges are very congested.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
model and state the hypotheses used in the paper. Moreover we separately analyse
all the agents’ dynamics which constitute our transportation system. In Section 3,
we prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium and, in Section 4, we study a
new mean field game problem with a constraint on the set of admissible controls.
In Section 5, we draw conclusions and suggests future works.
Notation. Hereinafter, in the paper we will use the following notation.
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V the finite set of vertices;
E the finite set of directed edges;
e the index of the edge;
p the index of path;
o the origin vertex;
d the destination vertex;
νe the tail vertex of the edge e;
κe the head vertex of the edge e;
ℓe the length of edge e;
uep(·) the measurable control for agents in the edge e ∈ p;
uep[t] the optimal constant control chosen at starting time t for traversing e ∈ p;
Ce the maximal mass of agents that can enter in e per unit of time;
ρmax the maximal mass of agents that can be present at the same time in e;
Γ the set of all the paths p from o to d;
A the edge-path incidence matrix (see (1));
Ξ the number of pairs (e, p) ∈ E × Γ : e ∈ p;
λ(t) the total flow entering the network in the origin o at time t (throughput);
Sλ(t) The simplex of a probability vector over Γ (see (5));
β the fixed noise parameter;
η the update rate of the path preferences;
L(w) the Lipschitz constant of a function w;
L˜ the common Lipschitz constant to all the functions belong to X (see (25));
|.| cardinality of a set, e.g., |B| is the cardinality of set B;
∧ minimum operator, e.g., a ∧ b = min{a, b}.
2. Model description. We describe the flow dynamics over a network of possible
paths that the agents can choose to traverse within a time interval [0, T ], where
T > 0 is the final horizon.
2.1. Network characteristics. The network is a directed multi-graph G = (V , E),
where: V is a finite set of vertices, generically denoted by v, and E is a finite set of
directed edges, generically denoted by e = (νe, κe) being νe the tail vertex of e and
κe 6= νe the head vertex.
The set V includes two special vertices, the orign o and the destination d, where
the agents enter and leave the network, respectively. Each edge e ∈ E is character-
ized by three finite parameters: its length ℓe; its flow capacity Ce, expressing the
maximum number of agents that can enter in e per unit of time; and maximum
mass ρmax denoting the maximum number of agents that can be present at the
same time in e. We assume ρmax be the same for each e ∈ E .
An (oriented) path from a vertex v0 to a vertex vr is an ordered set of r adja-
cent edges p = (e1, e2, . . . , er) such that νe1 = v0, κer = vr, vs = κes = νes+1 for
1 ≤ s ≤ r − 1, and no vertex is visited twice, i.e., vl 6= vs for all 0 ≤ l < s ≤ r,
except possibly for v0 = vr, in which case the path is referred to as a cycle. A
vertex vj is said to be reachable from another vertex vk if there exists at least a
path from vk to vj .
In particular, we hold the following assumptions on the multi-graph G:
• G contains no cycles;
• any vertex in V can be reached from the origin vertex o and the destination
vertex d is reachable from any vertex in V .
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We denote by Γ the set of all the paths p from o to d. We denote by A the
|E| × |Γ| edge-path incidence matrix with entries
Aep =
{
1 if e ∈ p,
0 otherwise.
(1)
and by
Ξ =
∑
e∈E
∑
p∈Γ
Aep, with |E| ≤ Ξ ≤ |E| × |Γ|,
the number of the elements equal to 1 of the matrix A, that is, the number of pairs
edge-path (e, p) ∈ E × Γ such that e ∈ p.
For every path p ∈ Γ and edge e ∈ p, we define two functions
ρep : [0, T ]→ [0, ρmax], f
e
p : [0, T ]→ [0, Ce],
which denote the current mass and current flow of agents following path p, re-
spectively, present and leaving the edge e at at each time instant t ∈ [0, T ]. We
let
ρ(t) := {ρep(t) : e ∈ p, p ∈ Γ} ∈ R
Ξ, f(t) := {fep (t) : e ∈ p, p ∈ Γ} ∈ R
Ξ, (2)
be the vectors of masses and flows, respectively.
In order to simplify notations and statements, in this paper we consider a graph G
on which agents have only three possible paths to reach d starting from o (see
Figure 1). Accordingly, the set of paths is Γ = {p1, p2, p3}, where p1 = (e1, e4),
o
v1
v2
d
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
Figure 1. The graph topology used in the paper.
p2 = (e2, e5), p3 = (e1, e3, e5). However, all the results obtained in the next sections
can be proved for more general networks, still satisfying the assumptions i) and ii)
above.
2.2. Agents’ dynamics and costs. We assume that the agents are indistinguish-
able. Each agent enters the network G by the origin vertex, chooses a path p ∈ Γ,
travels through G along p, and finally leaves the network from the destination ver-
tex.
We let λ : [0, T ]→ [0,+∞[ be a given function describing the throughput of the
agents, i.e., λ(t) is the total flow of agents entering the network in the origin o at
time t. In addition, we let θe ∈ [0, ℓe] be the state of the generic agent over an
edge e ∈ E . The value θe(s) describes the position of the agent at time s from the
tail of e, i.e., θe(s) = 0 means that the agent is in νe, while θe(s) = ℓe means that
the agent is in κe and hence it is inside the edge e as long as 0 ≤ θe(s) ≤ ℓe. We
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stress that θe(s) describes the state of an hypothetical agent assumed to be in νe
at time t, independently of the fact whether there is actually someone present at
νe at that time.
The controlled dynamics in any edge e ∈ E of an agent who entered the edge at
time t ∈ [0, T ] is: {
θ˙e(s) = u
e(s), s ∈]t, T ],
θe(t) = 0,
(3)
where the control, s 7→ ue(s), is measurable and integrable, namely ue ∈ L1(0, T ).
Each agent traversing an edge e at a given time t, aims at minimizing a cost that
takes into account: i) the possible hassle of running in the edge to reach d on time;
ii) the pain of being entrapped in a highly congested edge; iii) the disappointment
of not being able to reach d by the final horizon T . We model this cost analytically
as
Je(t, u
e) =
∫ T
t
χ{0≤θe(s)≤ℓe}
 (ue(s))2
2
+ ϕe
 ∑
pˆ∈Γ|e∈pˆ
ρepˆ(s)
 ds
+χ{0≤θe(T )<ℓe}α
∑
j∈pe
ℓj , (4)
where χ is the characteristic function
χ{0≤θe(s)≤ℓe} =
{
1 if 0 ≤ θe(s) ≤ ℓe,
0 otherwise,
and similarly for χ{0≤θe(T )<ℓe}; α > 0 is a constant parameter representing a cost
per unit of length, and pe is the shortest path from the tail νe to d. The quadratic
term inside the integral in (4) stands for the cost component i), while the other
term, characterized by the congestion function
ϕe : [0, ρmax]→ [0,+∞[,
stands for the congestion cost component. Finally, the last addendum in (4) stands
for cost component iii). In particular, note that, due to the presence of the charac-
teristic functions, the integral part is paid as long as the agent stays on the edge e.
The cost outside the integral acts as follows: 1) if at the final horizon T the agent
is still in between the edge (not reached the head κe yet), then the final paid cost
is the minimum distance in the graph from the tail νe of the actual edge to the
destination d; 2) if at the final horizon T the agent is at the head of the edge κe (i.e.
it has already traversed the whole edge), then the corresponding paid cost with re-
spect to the actual edge e is zero. Anyway it will be paid as the minimum distance
in the graph from the head vertex κe to the destination d just by interpreting that
head as the tail νe′ of any other subsequent edge e
′ hypothetically entered by the
agent at time T .
Throughout this paper we will assume the following basic assumptions to hold
on the agents’ behavior:
Assumptions 1.
1. The throughput λ is C1([0, T ]) and λ(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular,
this implies that there exist 0 < λ ≤ λ < +∞ such that λ ≤ λ(t) ≤ λ for all
t ∈ [0, T ].
2. The initial mass of agents is null, i.e., ρ(0) = 0.
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3. For every e ∈ E , the congestion cost function ϕe is Lipschitz continuous.
Moreover it only depends on the masses ρep and not on the state variable θe.
4. The network edges’ maximum mass is such that ρmax > λT ≥
∫ T
0
λ(s)ds and
the flow capacity Ce > λ, ∀e ∈ E , i.e., neither the mass capacity nor the flow
capacity of the edges can impede the agents’ movements even in the worst
case scenario.
5. When more than one optimal control is available, agents choose the smallest
one.
6. Agents have a bounded rationality in the sense that, even when they access
to the full available information, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and
the finite amount of time they have prevent them from using the pieces of
information to their full extent when making their decisions.
We remark that Assumption 1.2 means that no one is around the network at
t = 0, while Assumption 1.3 implies that all agents in the same edge at the same
instant equally suffer the same congestion. Moreover, Assumptions 1.1–1.3 imply
the boundedness of ϕe, for all e ∈ E .
The simplifying Assumption 1.4 will be partially dropped and discussed in the Sec-
tion 4.
Assumptions 1.5 and 1.6 models the human behavior of the agents. Assumptions 1.5
implies that agents, when they can choose, prefer to consume less energy than more,
e.g. they prefer to move slower than faster. In particular, this is implemented in
formula (15), and some other consideration on flow density may also justify it.
Assumptions 1.6 understands that agents typically have limited capabilities of fore-
casting the evolution of a dynamic system and of optimizing their decisions. The
consequence of this assumption are detailed in the rest of this subsection. Specif-
ically, it will used both in the definition of the agents’ aggregate path preference
and in the computation of the agents flows (12).
We assume that agents entering the network have access to the global information
about the current congestion status of the network through the knowledge of the
actual mass vector ρ. Then, they choose the path to follow on the basis of their
appraisal of the costs of the different paths and on the observation of the decision
of the agents that have preceded. Next, we formally introduce this concept.
The relative appeal of the different paths to the agents is modeled by a time-
varying nonnegative (aggregate) path preference vector z : [0, T ] → R
|Γ|
+ , whose
generic element zp(t) represents the flow’s density of agents entering path p at the
origin o at time t. The vector z varies within the simplex
Sλ(t) =
z ∈ R|Γ|+ : ∑
p∈Γ
zp(t) = λ(t)
 , (5)
where we recall that by λ(t) we denote the agents’ throughput at time t.
The path preference z(t) evolves over time as a function of the appraisal of the
costs that the agents would pay along the different paths. The agents assess these
costs in terms of the controls that they would implement and assuming known the
congestion level described by ρ. Specifically, the cost of each path p ∈ Γ at time t
is:
Jp(t) =
∑
e∈E:e∈p
Je(t
p
e(t), u
e
p), (6)
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where, for every e ∈ p, uep ∈ L
1(0, T ) is the optimal controls implemented along
the edges by an agents who is in the path p (these controls are discussed in the
following subsection); tpe(t) is the time instant in which an agent, arriving in t in
the origin o and following the path p, reaches νe using the controls u
e
p. We write
tpe(t) =∞ if an agent does not reach e within T and we define Je(∞, u
e
p) = 0.
We also assume that information on the congestion of the network provided to
the agents may be inexact, so that they assess a path p having a minimum cost
with probability e−βJ
p(t)/
∑
pˆ∈Γ e
−βJ pˆ(t), where β > 0 is a fixed noise parameter.
Hence, the fraction of agents entering the network at time t that would consider a
path p having minimum cost is
F pβ (t) = λ(t)
e−βJ
p(t)∑
pˆ∈Γ e
−βJ pˆ(t)
. (7)
Note that, when β tends to 0, then F pβ (t) tends to λ(t)/|Γ|, that is, agents consider
all the paths equivalent. Differently, when β tends to infinite the agents have the
possibility of surely determining the exact costs of the paths and indeed F pβ (t) tends
to 0 for all p, except for the path minimum cost, for which it tends to λ(t).
Hereinafter, we denote by Fβ(t) the vector {F
p
β (t) : p ∈ Γ} and by J(t) = {J
p(t) :
p ∈ Γ} the vector of costs on all the paths p ∈ Γ.
Agents make their final decision on the path to choose comparing the value
of Fβ(t) with the choice of the agents that have preceded them. Specifically, we
assume that they correct the difference z(t)−Fβ(t) with a proportional control, as
described by the following equation:
z˙(t)− F˙β(t) = −η
(
z(t)− Fβ(t)
)
, z(0) = z0, (8)
where, the parameter η > 0 can be interpreted as the rate at which the path prefer-
ences are updated. In other words, equation (8) says that the bounded rationality
of the agents makes them, on the one side, like the idea to split as indicated by
Fβ ; on the other side, prefer not to stray from previous agents’ decisions. We re-
mark that the dynamics described by (8) makes z(t) satisfies constraint (5) for all
t ∈]0, T ], whenever the same happens for z0.
Remark 1. Equation (8) can be seen as a generalization of the so called noisy best
response dynamics (see e.g., [12, 26]) and such generalization is needed because
of the non-constancy of λ. While with the noisy best response dynamics, the
agents update their path preference comparing the difference between the noisy
best response function and their current path preference, in (8) the agents acts in
a way to control the error between the answer to the global information about the
actual congestion status and the path preferences of agents who previously entered
the network. Another possible generalization of the noisy best response dynamics,
when λ varies over time, is the one given in [5].
The path preference z turns then useful, as in [26], to define, for every t ∈ [0, T ]
the local decision function G[t] : Sλ(t) → R
Ξ
+, which characterizes the fractions of
agents choosing each outward directed edge e ∈ p, p ∈ Γ when traversing a non
destination vertex v. Actually, in this paper, we are interesting only on the first
three component of this functions, (e1, p1), (e1, p3), (e2, p2), which are relative to
the two edges e1, e2 outgoing from the origin o (see Figure 1). We restrict our
attention to these three components since once the path is chosen in the origin, in
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the following non-destination vertices the agents get split according such a choice.
Hence, we define the first three component of G[t] and fix the others equal to zero
as follows:
G[t]
e
p(z) =

zp∑
pˆ∈Γ zpˆ
for e ∈ {e1, e2}, p ∋ e,
0 for e ∈ {e3, e4, e5}, p ∋ e.
(9)
Note that in (9), for every t ∈ [0, T ] and for every z ∈ Sλ(t), it is
∑
pˆ∈Γ zpˆ =
λ(t)≥ λ > 0, because of (5) and Assumption 1.1. Hence, for every t ∈ [0, T ], G[t] is a
continuous function defined over the compact set Sλ(t), and so uniformly continuous.
Definition (9) allows to write the equation that describes mass conservation, for
every non-destination vertex v and outward directed edge e ∈ p, p ∈ Γ , as:
ρ˙(t) = H(f(t), z(t); t) , ρ(0) = ρ0, (10)
where the flow t 7→ f(t) = (fep (t))
e
p ∈
(∏
e∈p[0, Ce]
)
p
is defined next, t 7→ z(t) =
(zp(t))p ∈ Sλ(t) is the solution of (8), and H :
∏
e∈p[0, Ce]× Sλ(t) → R
Ξ is defined,
for every t ∈ [0, T ], by
Hep(f(t), z(t); t) :=
(
λ(t)G[t]ep(z(t)) + f
precp(e)
p (t)
)
− fep (t) , ∀ p ∈ Γ, e ∈ p, (11)
with precp(e) the function that returns the edge that precedes e on the path p.
Each component fep (t) of the flow f(t) represents the outgoing flow from the edge
e at time t. Given Assumption 1.6, agents assess the outgoing flow assuming a
constant traverse time k ∈]0, T ] for each edge e ∈ E . Specifically, k is what the
agents assess as the maximum time such that for any t ∈ [T − k, T ] the optimal
control uep(t) is certainly null. In other words, for t ∈ [T − k, T ], the agents think
that it is not convenient to traverse the edge, as the cost of running in the edge to
reach d at T is for sure greater than the cost of the disappointment of not being
able to reach d. Actually, such a value k > 0 can be a-priori evaluated by the data
of the problem. Then, we write the outgoing flows as:
fep (t) =

0 if t ∈ [0, k],
λ(t − k)G[t− k]ep(z(t− k))sign(u
e
p[t− k]) if t ∈ [k, T ],
for e ∈ {e1, e2}, p ∋ e,
(12a)
fep (t) =

0 if t ∈ [0, k],
f
precp(e)
p (t− k)sign(uep[t− k]) if t ∈ [k, T ],
for e ∈ {e3, e4, e5}, p ∋ e,
(12b)
where uep[t− k] ≥ 0 is the constant optimal control implemented by an agent that,
following path p, enters the edge e at time t − k, and sign(ξ) = 1 if ξ > 0 and
sign(ξ) = 0 if ξ = 0.
Remark 2. Conditions (12), coherently with Assumption 1.6, model the outgoing
flow fep (t) as possibly estimated by an agent entering e at time t− k that assumes
that all the other agents that are currently present on e and that are following the
same path p, are implementing the same controls uep[t − k], as itself. Of course, a
more precise formulation of them should consider the actual value of the control
(and not only their sign) and estimate the real traverse time (something similar in
this direction is made in [4]). Similarly, the mass ρ that satisfies (10) may be more
precisely defined in order to represent the real dynamics of the agents. Anyway,
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such estimated flows and mass evolution may be also seen as an approximation for
the elaboration in real time of the information that a possible network manager has
to implement in order to send them to the agents. The study of the real discrepancy
of such estimated flows and mass evolution form the actual ones may be the subject
of future works.
However, note that the estimated flows fep , when implemented in (10), make
the principle of mass concentration satisfied that is, for example when ρ0 ≡ 0, the
actual total mass present in the networks is the mass entered through the origin:∫ t
0
ρ(s)ds =
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
Moreover, by (10)–(12), and by Assumption 1.1, we have that any solution ρ of
(10) is Lipschitz continuous with Lispchitz constant L = 3λ, independently on the
optimal control u, on the initial value ρ0, and the costs J .
Finally, let us observe that (10)–(12) do not preclude the possibility that agents
accumulate at the beginning of an edge e, i.e., on the vertex νe. This situation may
occur, when the optimal control is uep = 0, since the corresponding outflow f
e
p = 0.
2.3. Value functions and optimal controls. Given a vector mass concentration
ρ(·), for each p ∈ Γ, e ∈ p and t ∈ [0, T ], we define the following quantities,
representing the optimum that an agent, following path p and entering edge e at
time t, may get ∀ p ∈ Γ:
V ep (t) =

inf
ue
p
∈L1(0,T )
{∫ T∧τ
t
(
(uep(s))
2
2
+ ϕe
( ∑
pˆ∈Γ|e∈pˆ
ρepˆ(s)
))
ds+ Fep(T ∧ τ)
}
if e ∈ p \ {last(p)},
inf
ue
p
∈L1(0,T )
{Je(t, uep)} if e = last(p),
(13)
where τ is the first exit time from the closed interval [0, ℓe], last(p) is a function
that returns the last edge of a path p and Fep (T ∧ τ) is given by
Fep(T ∧ τ) =

V
succp(e)
p (τ) if τ < T,
α
∑
j∈pe
ℓj if τ > T,
min
{
α
∑
j∈pe
ℓj , V
succp(e)
p (τ)
}
if τ = T,
(14)
with succp(e) the function which returns the edge that follows e on path p, for
e ∈ p \ {last(p)}.
The quantities in (13) are recursively and backwardly defined, starting from the
ones corresponding to the last edges ending in the destination vertex d. We call
them, with a little abuse of terminology, value functions. Note that such a recursive
definition is valid as the absence of oriented cycles in the network G prevents self-
referring. The value functions will turn useful in the next section, where we identify
a mean field equilibrium. There, instead of considering the standard Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equations, we will write, as in [4], equivalent conditions in terms
of the value functions due to the presence of a discontinuous final cost. The value
functions (13) do not depend on the position θe of the agents on the edge e ∈ p,
because, as we are going to show, the optimal behavior of the agents is, for any
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traversed edge, to implement a constant control uep ≥ 0 chosen when they enter
the edges. The main reason for that is the fact that the congestion functions ϕe
depend on the total mass actually present in the edge and not on the state position
of the single agent. Indeed, consider an agent that, in an edge e, moves from the
tail νe at time t
′ and reaches the vertex κe at time t
′′. Moreover, as we are going
to do in the next section, we can suppose the mass concentration ρ as given. The
component
∫ t′′
t′
ϕe(
∑
pˆ∈Γ|e∈pˆ ρ
e
pˆ(s))ds of the cost (4) can be then assumed as given,
whenever the agent in νe at time t
′ decides to reach κe at time t
′′.
Let us now enumerate some facts that, under our hypotheses, hold for the optimal
behavior of the agents.
i) When t′′ is chosen (which means that the agent has decided to traverse the
edge), the agent has only to minimize the component
1
2
∫ t′′
t′
(uep(s))
2ds of the cost Je in (13), and this happens when the control is
chosen constant and equal to the constant value uep =
ℓe
t′′−t′ . Also note that,
with such a choice, in (13), it is τ = t′′.
ii) The previous point i) also excludes the possibility that an optimally behaving
agent remains at νe (i.e, chooses u
e
p = 0) for a positive time interval and
then moves later; or, similarly, that it stops and stay still in a intermediate
point of the edge for a positive time interval; or that the agent goes back
and forth along edge e. Hence, an optimal control uep is always constant and
non-negative.
iii) From the previous points i)–ii), similarly arguing as in [4], we get that op-
timally behaving agents cannot accumulate on points strictly internal to the
edge, and moreover they also cannot get over each other along the edge be-
cause it is impossible that two optimally behaving agents, moving from νe at
time t′1 < t
′
2 respectively, reaches κe at time t
′′
2 < t
′′
1 , respectively. These facts
come from dynamic programming arguments, taking account that any control
which is not constant when crossing the edge cannot be otpimal. In particu-
lar, this also implies that whenever at time t an optimal choice is uep = 0 (i.e.
to not move) for which the arrival time is +∞, then uep = 0 will be the unique
optimal control for all subsequent instants t′ ≥ t and hence there will be no
controls’ multiplicity from this t onwards.
iv) For an agent in νe such that κe = d (i.e. it stands on the tail of the last
edge of the chosen path p), it is certainly not optimal to reach d before T and
wait there for a positive time length as, in any case, that agent would pay the
congestion costs in d for this interval (see the cost (4).
v) The following situation is instead possible only for t′′ = T : two optimally
behaving agents, moving from νe at time t
′
1 < t
′
2 respectively, reaches κe at
the same time t′′. Indeed, since the optimal control is necessarily constant
(point i)), then any agent that at the time t starts to traverse an edge e
as part of a path p, has only to optimally choose the arrival time τ to the
vertex of the edge and implement the constant control uep ≡ ℓe/(τ−t) (see the
terms minimized over τ in (19), (21), (23)). Hence if τ = t′′ < T , then being
τ = t′′ a minimizing value internal to ]t, T [, differentiating and imposing the
derivatives equal to zero, we get a contradiction. In [4] (Appendix A point 1)
the case when the value functions V are not derivable is also treated.
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Note that in this case an accumulation of agents (Dirac mass) may ap-
pear in κe, but the time t
′′ = T is the final horizon and hence the game is
immediately over and that Dirac mass does not flow.
vi) What is instead formally possible is that for an agent moving from νe at time
t′, the choices of reaching κe at two times t
′′
1 < t
′′
2 are both optimal. In this
case, for similar considerations as before, only agents entering the edge at
time t′ may reach κe at a time t
′′ ∈ [t′′1 , t
′′
2 ]. Hence, in the interval [t
′′
1 , t
′′
2 ],
actually no density of agents arrives and by virtue of similar reasonings to
those made in [4] (Appendix A point 2) we can assume, without restriction,
that the agents moving from νe at time t
′ all arrive in κe at time t
′′
2 . More
generally, in accordance with Assumption 1.5, for every t ∈ [0, T ], for every
edge e and path p containing e, we define
τ∗e,p(t) = max
{
τ ∈]t, T ] : uep ≡
ℓe
τ − t
is optimal
}
and then, without restriction, we assume that the optimal control imple-
mented by an agent that starts to traverse the edge e as part of the path p
is
uep ≡
ℓe
τ∗e,p(t)− t
, (15)
when
{
τ ∈]t, T ] : uep ≡
ℓe
τ−t is optimal
}
6= ∅, and uep ≡ 0 otherwise (which
may corresponds to τ∗e,p(t) = +∞.
Remark 3. By the previous points i)–vi), the function t 7→ τ∗e,p(t), whenever it is
finite, is increasing. Hence it is continuous almost everywhere and moreover, if t is
a continuity point, then τ∗e,p(t) is the unique possible optimal arrival time.
Hereinafter, we denote by
u = {uep : e ∈ p, p ∈ Γ, u
e
p ≥ 0},
the controls’ vector, and by uep[t] we will denote the optimal constant control chosen
by an agent that stands in νe at time t when following the path p. Moreover, we do
not display the argument
∑
pˆ∈Γ|e∈pˆ ρ
e
pˆ of ϕe, whenever it is not strictly necessary.
Consider now an agent standing at νe at time t < T , and hence at θe(t) = 0,
where κe = d, i.e (looking to the Figure 1 ) for the pairs (e, p) ∈ {(e4, p1), (e5, p2), (e5, p3)}.
It has two possible choices: either staying at νe indefinitely or moving to reach
κe = d exactly at time T . Accordingly, the candidate constant optimal controls to
be chosen at the time t are
uep,1[t] ≡0, u
e
p,2[t] ≡
ℓe
T − t
. (16)
Hence, given the cost functional (4), we derive
V ep (t) = min
{
αℓe,
1
2
(ℓe)
2
T − t
}
+
∫ T
t
ϕe ds. (17)
An agent standing at νe3 at time t ∈ [0, T ] has two possible choices: staying in
νe3 or moving to reach κe3 at some (optimal) instants τ ∈]t, T ]. Hence, we obtain
that the agent has to choose between the following two kinds of candidate constant
optimal controls:
ue3p3,1[t] ≡ 0, u
e3
p3,2
[t] ≡
ℓe3
τ − t
, (18)
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whose associated value function is:
V e3p3 (t) = min
{
α (ℓe3 + ℓe5) +
∫ T
t
ϕe3 ds, inf
τ∈]t,T ]
{
1
2
(ℓe3)
2
τ − t
+
∫ τ
t
ϕe3 ds+ V
e5
p3
(τ)
}}
(19)
An agent standing at νe1 at time t and following a path p ∈ {p1, p3} may choose
between staying in νe1 or reaching κe1 at a certain τ ∈]t, T ]. Hence, the candidate
constant optimal controls are:
ue1p,1[t] ≡ 0, u
e1
p,2[t] ≡
ℓe1
τ − t
(20)
whose associated value functions are:
V e1p1 (t) = min
{
α
(
ℓe1 + ℓe4
)
+
∫ T
t
ϕe1 ds, inf
τ∈]t,T ]
{
1
2
(ℓe1)
2
τ − t
+
∫ τ
t
ϕe1 ds+ V
e4
p1
(τ)
}}
(21a)
V e1p3 (t) = min
{
α
(
ℓe1 + ℓe3 + ℓe5
)
+
∫ T
t
ϕe1 ds, (21b)
inf
τ∈]t,T ]
{
1
2
(ℓe1)
2
τ − t
+
∫ τ
t
ϕe1 ds+ V
e3
p3
(τ)
}}
.
Analogous arguments hold for computing V e2p2 (t) when an agent is standing at
νe2 . The candidate constant optimal controls are
ue2p2,1[t] ≡ 0, u
e2
p2,2
[t] ≡
ℓe2
τ − t
, (22)
whose associated value function is:
V e2p2 (t) = min
{
α(ℓe2+ℓe5)+
∫ T
t
ϕe2 ds, inf
τ∈]t,T ]
{
1
2
(ℓe2)
2
τ − t
+
∫ τ
t
ϕe2 ds+ V
e5
p2
(τ)}
}}
.
(23)
Remark 4. We remark that, the optimal controls described in (18), (20), (22)
are detected, along with the possible arrival time τ , by the minimization process
carried on in (19), (21), (23). Also, when ρ is given, the construction of the optimal
controls may be performed backwardly, starting from the problem (17). Also note
that, the minimization processes in τ are admissible because of the coercivity of
the minimizing term when τ → t+.
We now give in the following a result of Lipschitz continuity of the value functions
defined above that will turn useful in the next section.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that ρ is given continuous and that Assumptions 1
hold. Then, every value function V ep : [0, T ] → R, for all e ∈ p, p ∈ Γ defined
by (17)-(23) is: Lipschitz continuous, with Lipschitz constant independent of ρ;
bounded independently on ρ; continuous with respect to the mass density ρ (via the
congestion functions ϕ), i.e, whenever ρn → ρ uniformly, then V ep,n → V
e
p uniformly
in [0, T ].
Proof. Assumptions 1 implies that
∑
pˆ∈Γ|e∈pˆ ρ
e
pˆ≤ ρmax is bounded , independently
from controls, paths and edges, then there exists a positive constant k1 such that,
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for every 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T , it always holds:∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t2
t1
ϕe
 ∑
pˆ∈Γ|e∈pˆ
ρepˆ(s)
 ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥ϕe
 ∑
pˆ∈Γ|e∈pˆ
ρepˆ(·)

∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
|t2 − t1| ≤ k1 |t2 − t2| ≤ k1T.
(24)
Now, take e as the last edge of the path p (i.e. looking to see Figure 1, (e, p) ∈
{(e4, p1), (e5, p2), (e5, p3)}), and consider V ep as defined in (17). It is evident that it
is of the form
V ep (t) =
1
2
(ℓe)
2
T − t
+
∫ T
t
ϕeds,
only if T−t ≥ ℓe/(2α), that is t ≤ T−ℓe/(2α) ≤ T−h with h > 0 independent on p
and its last edge e, on ρ and on controls. Using also (24), we then get the Lipschitz
continuity of all value functions V ep in (17), with the same Lipschitz constant. We
also easily get the equiboundedness of those V ep .
Proceeding backwards, let us consider V e3p3 (t) given by (19). We concentrate on
the term minimized with respect to τ ∈]t, T ] in (19). Again, as before (see also
Remark 4), there exists h > 0 independent on ρ, on controls and on t ∈ [0, T ]
such that, for any t, whenever V e3p3 (t) is defined as that minimized term, then the
minimizing values τ belong to [t+h, T ] (and V e3p3 (t) is certainly defined as the other
term in the exterior minimization in (19) when t+ h > T ). Hence, for every t, we
consider the function
ψt : [t+ h, T ]→ R, τ 7→
1
2
(ℓe3)
2
τ − t
+
∫ τ
t
ϕe3ds+ V
e5
p3
(τ).
Note that ψt is Lipschitz continuous for every t, with Lipschitz constant M > 0
independent on t and on ρ (because so is V e5p3 from previous considerations). For
0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T , and for τ ∈ [t2 + h, T ], we get (see also (24)), again for M > 0
independent from all,∣∣ψt1(τ) − ψt2(τ)∣∣ ≤ 1
2
∣∣∣∣ (ℓe3)2τ − t1 − (ℓe3)
2
τ − t2
∣∣∣∣+ ∫ t2
t1
ϕe3ds
≤
1
2
(ℓe3)
2
h2
|t1 − t2|+ k1|t1 − t2| = M |t1 − t2|.
Let τ1, τ2 be two points of minimum for ψ
t1 and ψt2 respectively. We get
ψt1(τ1)− ψ
t2(τ2) ≤ ψ
t1(τ2)− ψ
t2(τ2) ≤M |t1 − t2|.
If τ1 ≥ t2 + h, we then similarly get
ψt2(τ2)− ψ
t1(τ1) ≤ ψ
t2(τ1)− ψ
t1(τ1) ≤M |t1 − t2|.
If instead, t1 + h ≤ τ1 < t2 + h, then we get
ψt2(τ2)− ψ
t1(τ1) = ψ
t2(τ2)± ψ
t2(t2 + h)± ψ
t1(t2 + h)− ψ
t1(τ1) ≤ 2M |t1 − t2|.
We then get the Lipschitz continuity of V e3p3 in (19), with Lipschitz constant inde-
pendent on ρ.
Arguing similarly, in a backward manner, one proves the Lipschitz continuity of
the value functions in (21) and (23), with Lipschitz constant independent on ρ.
Now, still proceeding backwardly, for a uniformly convergent sequence of mass
densities ρn → ρ, we easily get that the corresponding value functions in (17)
uniformly converge. From this, we obtain that the corresponding value functions in
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(19) and (21) pointwise converge. But they are also equibounded and equi-Lipschitz
and so uniformly converge. We conclude proceeding backwardly i this way.
Remark 5. An immediate consequence of Proposition 2.1 and of Assumption 1.1 is
that F pβ (t) defined in (7) is Lipschitz and equi-Lipschitz continuous. Indeed, F
p
β (t)
is built considering the cost Jp in (6) which is the “sum” of the value functions V ep
(13) that by Proposition 2.1 are Lipschitz and equi-Lipschitz continuous.
3. Existence of a mean field equilibrium. In this section we prove the existence
of a mean field equilibrium for ρ over the considered network G. Specifically, we
proceed as follows.
First, we let L(w) be the Lipschitz constant of a function w and we choose as a
space to search for a fixed point:
X =
{
w : [0, T ]→ [0, ρmax] : L(w) ≤ L˜, |w| ≤ ρmax
}Ξ
, (25)
the Cartesian product Ξ times of the space of Lipschitzian functions with Lipschitz
constant not greater than L˜ and overall bounded by ρmax, where L˜ is a constant.
Space X is convex and compact with respect to the uniform topology.
Then, fixed the noisy parameter β > 0, we search for a fixed point of the function
ψ : X → X , with ρ 7→ ρ′ = ψ(ρ) where ρ′ is obtained performing the following
steps (see diagram in Fig. 2):
i) given the mass ρ the optimal control u is derived through (17)-(23);
ii) the optimal control u is used both to compute the flow vector f through (12)
and to obtain the path preference vector z through (8) by first computing the
vector of costs J ;
iii) the mass vector ρ′ is derived from f and z through (10) by first computing
the vectors G through (9) and H through (11).
ρ u J z G(z) H(f, z) ρ′
f
Figure 2. Fixed point scheme.
Note that a suitable constant L˜ exists such that the function ψ maps X into itself.
Indeed, note that, by construction, ψ(ρ) must satisfy (10) and hence, by Remark
2 and Assumption 1.4, the bound |ρ| ≤ ρmax is satisfied and, as Lipschitz constant
we can take L˜ = 3λ.
Definition 3.1. Let ψ the function described above. Then a mean field equilibrium
is a total mass ρ ∈ X that satisfies ρ = ψ(ρ).
Now we show that the function ψ is continuous so that Brouwer fixed-point
theorem can be applied and a mean field equilibrium exists.
Lemma 3.2. The function ψ : X → X is continuous.
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Proof. We show that for every sequence {ρn} ⊂ X and for every ρ ∈ X such that
ρn → ρ uniformly, we get ψ(ρn)→ ψ(ρ) uniformly. We divide the proof into several
steps.
(1) Consider the value functions V e,np and V
e
p , for every e ∈ p, p ∈ Γ defined by
(17),(19),(21),(23) and associated, respectively, to the choices of masses ρn and ρ
in the congestion cost vector ϕ = {ϕe : e ∈ E}, where each component ϕe has as
argument the corresponding component of ρn and ρ, respectively. By Proposition
2.1 since ρn → ρ uniformly, then V e,np → V
e
p ∀ e ∈ p uniformly in [0, T ].
For every fixed t, let un[t] and u[t] be the corresponding constant optimal controls
for traversing at time t a given edge e in a given path p (here not displayed), with the
corresponding optimal arrival time τ∗n(t), τ
∗(t) (see (15)). By compactness, there
exists a real number ut such that, at least for a subsequence, un[t] → ut. By the
convergence of the value functions, and consequently of the minimizing expressions
(17),(19),(21),(23), we have that the constant ut is an optimal constant control for
traversing, at time t, the edge e, as part of the path p, with the given limit mass
ρ. By Remark 3, if t is a continuity point of τ∗(·), then the only optimal control
for the limit problem is u[t] ≡ ℓe
τ∗(t)−t , and hence the limit is independent from the
subsequence. Again by Remark 3, we then get that the sequence of optimal control
functions un[·] almost everywhere converges to the limit optimal control u[·]. By
the dominated convergence theorem they then converge in L1(0, T ).
(2) Consider the functions F p,nβ and F
p
β for every p ∈ Γ defined by (7) and
associated, respectively, to the optimal controls un[·] and u[·] introduced in the
point (1). By Remark 5 and since V e,np → V
e
p ∀ e ∈ p uniformly, it follows that
F p,nβ → F
p
β (t)∀ p ∈ Γ uniformly. Let now {z
n} and z be the sequence of path
preference vectors and the path preference vector induced, respectively, by Fnβ and
Fβ through (8). Note that the sequence z
n is equi-bounded and equi-Lipschitz
continuous (since zn, Fnβ and F˙
n
β are bounded), hence, there exists z˜ such that, at
least along a subsequence, zn → z˜. Now using (8) for both zn and z˜ we get
zn(t) = zn(0)− η
( ∫ t
0
zn(s) ds−
∫ t
0
Fnβ (s) ds
)
+ Fnβ (t)− F
n
β (0), (26a)
z˜(t) = z˜(0)− η
( ∫ t
0
z˜(s) ds−
∫ t
0
Fβ(s) ds
)
+ Fβ(t)− Fβ(0). (26b)
From the above considerations follows that the right hand side of (26a) converges
to the right hand side of (26b). Hence, by the uniqueness of the solution of (8) one
gets that z˜(t) = z(t)∀ t ∈ [0, T ] and zn(t)→ z(t). Say that, since the function G[t]
is uniformly continuous then G[t](zn(t)) converges to G[t](z(t)).
(3) Taking into account the optimal controls un[·] and u[·] introduced in the
point (1) such that un[·] → u[·] in L1(0, T ) and almost everywhere, and given the
throughput λ for every t ∈ [0, T ], we can compute the corresponding flows fn and
f as in (12). We now want to prove that fn → f in L1(0, T ) for which it is enough
to show that sign(un[·])→ sign(u[·]) in L1(0, T ).
By the optimization procedure (16)–(23) follows that, each agent when enters an
edge e decides either to stop or to keep a constant control strictly grater than zero,
which allows the agent to reach the other extreme of the edge within time T . Then,
any control u[·] > 0 is lower bounded by a constant ℓe
T
> 0 (for every edge e in a
given path p). As a consequence if un[·] → u[·] > 0, we have u[·] ≥ ℓe
T
> 0. Hence,
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sign(un[·])→ sign(u[·]) = 1.
Differently, if un[·] → u[·] = 0, by the limit definition follows that from a certain
n onward un[·] < ℓe
T
and hence, by its optimality, un[·] = 0 which in turn implies
that sign(un[·])→ sign(u[·]) = 0. Therefore we have proven the almost everywhere
convergence of signs from which, by the dominated convergence, their convergence
in L1(0, T ), and hence the one of the flows.
Then we can compute (edge by edge) ψ(ρn) and ψ(ρ) integrating the mass con-
servation (10):
ψ(ρn(t)) = ρ
n(0) +
∫ t
0
(λ(s)G[s](zn(s)) + fprec,n(s)) ds−
∫ t
0
fn(s) ds; (27a)
ψ(ρ(t)) = ρ(0) +
∫ t
0
(λ(s)G[s](z(s)) + fprec(s)) −
∫ t
0
f(s) ds. (27b)
Now, using all the previous arguments in the points (1), (2) and (3) we get that
the right hand side of (27a) converges to the right hand side of (27b), from which
ψ(ρn(t))→ ψ(ρ(t)) for every t ∈ [0, T ], and also uniformly, being them equibounded
and equi-Lipschitz because belonging toX . Hence, by Brouwer fixed point theorem,
the map ρ→ ψ(ρ) has a fixed point which is the mean field equilibrium.
4. Mass-depending bounded controls. In the previous sections we have as-
sumed that the set of admissible values for the controls u was the whole real line
R, even if, from an optimization argument, the really implemented controls were
non-negative and bounded. This fact implied that, at least formally, each agent has
at disposal any possible values for the control, which we recall can be interpreted
as scalar velocity, even if the edge is very congested. From a modeling point of
view, this may be not satisfying. Hence, here we assume that there is bound on the
set of admissible controls, and that such a bound somehow depends on the actual
values of the mass concentration ρe on the edge e, coherently with the feature of
our model, where any agent in the edge e at time t suffers the same congestion
ρe(t). Hence, for every edge e, we consider a function Ue :]0,+∞[→ [0,+∞[, such
that
i) Ue is continuous and decreasing and strictly positive;
ii) limξ→0+ U
e(ξ) = +∞, limξ→+∞ Ue(ξ) = 0.
We then assume that, at any time t, an agent in the edge e has at disposal the
bounded interval [0, Ue(ρe(t))], as admissible values for controls. That is, if in the
time interval [t1, t2], an agent is in the edge e, then it can only use measurable
controls such that
u(s) ∈ [0, Ue(ρe(s))] a.e. s ∈ [t1, t2]. (28)
Note that, without loosing generality, we already restrict ourselves to non-negative
controls: indeed, also in this case, by an optimization point of view, the use of
negative controls (i.e. to move back on the edge) will be certainly not optimal.
We now suppose that the continuous evolution of the mass distribution t 7→
ρ(t) is given (as in the fixed point procedure). In the previous sections, again
by optimization arguments, see (18)–(23), the actual optimization parameter for
an agent entering the edge e at time t was just τ > t, the arrival time on the
vertex of the edge, and then, when moving was optimal, the optimal control to be
implemented was the constant one u ≡ ℓe/(τ − t). Hence, for every edge e and
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every time t ∈ [0, T ], we define
τ(t, e, ρe) = τ > t such that
∫ τ
t
Ue(ρe(s))ds = ℓe
with the convention that τ(t, e, ρe) = +∞ when such τ > t does not exist in [t, T ].
Hence τ(t, e, ρe), when finite, represents the minimal arrival time on κe for an agent
entering the edge e at time t and using controls satisfying the constraint (28) in
[t, τ(t, e, ρe)[, whereas, when it is infinite, it means that there is no possibility to
reach κe by the final time T .
Note that, restricting ourselves to the values t such that τ(t, e, ρe) < +∞, the
function t 7→ τ(t, e, ρe) is strictly increasing. Indeed, if for some t1 < t2 we have
τ(t2, e, ρ
e) ≤ τ(t1, e, ρe), then we would have∫ t2
t1
Ue(ρe(s))ds +
∫ τ(t1,e,ρe)
τ(t2,e,ρe)
Ue(ρe(s))ds = 0,
which is a contradiction due to the strict positivity of Ue.
Now, let us note that, even if τ ≥ τ(t, e, ρe), then the corresponding constant
velocity u ≡ ℓe/(τ − t) of traversing the edge does not necessarily satisfy the con-
straint (28). On the other side, we would like to recover, in this constraint case
too, many of the results of the previous sections, in particular all the properties
of the optimal control (see i)–vi) Section 2.3) coming from their constancy when
traversing the edge. To this end, we relax our constrained optimal control problem
(with constraint given by (28)) in the following one:
Constraint on the arrival time: every agent that enters the edge e at time t ≥ 0
optimizes (18)–(23) among τ ∈ [τ(t, e, ρe),+∞]. That is, it can implement any
measurable control (not necessarily satisfying the constraint (28)), provided that it
satisfies the constraint on the arrival time on κe: the arrival time must be not less
than τ(t, e, ρe).
In order to state such a new mean field game problem with lower bound on
the arrival time, instead of starting from the existence of the function U giving
the velocity-constraint (28), we start from the existence of a given arrival-time-
constraint function with suitable properties.
Assumption 4.1. For every edge e ∈ E there exists a function
τ(·, e, ·) : [0, T ]× C0([0, T ],R+)→ [0,+∞[, (t, ρe) 7→ τ(t, e, ρe)
such that:
a) it is Lipschitz-continuous (with C0([0, T ],R+) endowed by the uniform topol-
ogy);
b) τ(t, e, ρe) > t ∀ (t, ρe);
c) it is strictly increasing in t, for every ρe fixed;
d) it is strictly increasing in ρe for every fixed t, that is
ρe1 ≤ ρ
e
2 in [t, τ(t, e, ρ
e
1)], ∃ s ∈ [t, τ(t, e, ρ
e
1)] such that ρ
e
1(s) < ρ
e
2(s) =⇒
τ(t, e, ρe1) < τ(t, e, ρ
e
2).
Hence, in this setting, the mean field game problem is as the one in the previous
sections, with the only difference that in the minimization of the costs (4), every
agent entering the edge e at time t ≥ 0 implements controls from the set
U(t, e, ρe) =
{
u ∈ L1(0, T ) : the corresponding arrival time is τ ≥ τ(t, e, ρe)
}
,
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instead of controls from the whole space L1(0, T ).
In order to apply to this setting all the argumentation and calculations of the
previous sections, we have to test the validity of the points i)–vi) of Section 2.3,
and the Lipschitz continuity of the value functions (17)–(23) where, in this case,
the minimization in τ are, instead of for τ ∈]t, T ], for τ ∈ [τ(t, e, ρe), T ]. In what
follows, we tacitly refer to those points.
i)–ii) For every τ ≥ τ(t, e, ρe) the constant control ℓe/(τ−t) belongs to U(t, e, ρ
e)
with arrival time τ , and hence, for the same reasons it is the minimizing one. Also
iii) and iv) come again from the same considerations as in the Section 2.3.
v) Here, we observe that, since t 7→ τ(t, e, ρe) is strictly increasing, then, if
for t1 < t2 we have the same optimizing arrival time τ , it must be τ(t1, e, ρ
e) <
τ(t2, e, ρ
e) ≤ τ ≤ T . Taking t1 < t′ < t2, by the points iii), agents starting at time t′
must have the same arrival time τ . Hence we get τ(t1, e, ρ
e) < τ(t′, e, ρe) < τ ≤ T .
If then we assume τ < T , we then get a contradiction because τ , being and interior
minimizing point of the costs of agents starting at t1 as well as at t
′, is a stationary
point and we conclude using the first order condition (see [4], where the possible
non-differentiability of V is also taken into account).
vi) This point is similarly valid in this constrained case.
For the Lipschitz continuity of the value functions V ep (17)–(23), we just observe
that now the minimization is for τ ∈ [τ(t, e, ρe), T ] but, as done in the proof of
Proposition 2.1, the minimizing τ of the function ψt still belongs to [t+ h, T ].
Finally, we observe that in the definition of the flows (12), k is defined as a
quantity such that to start to traverse the edge at a time after T −k is certainly not
convenient. However in that definition it has also the meaning of a (approximately
estimated) mean minimal traversing time. Here, in this constrained situation, it
would be more precise to take account also of the minimal traversing time due to
the constraint τ(t, e, ρe). Hence we define the mean minimal traversing time as
τ (e, ρe) =
1
T
∫ T
0
(τ(s, e, ρe)− s) ds
and replace k in (12) by k˜ = max{k, τ(e, ρe)} (which is sufficiently less than T if
T is large, otherwise we can suitably cut it). Note that, by our hypotheses, the
function ρe 7→ τ (e, ρe) is continuous with respect to the uniform convergence and
hence we can still apply all the fixed point machinery as in the previous section.
Remark 6. The constrained case here discussed may be also a model to take
account for a possible upper bound on the mass because it is concerned with a
bound on the admissible velocity, which is decreasing with the mass concentration
on the edge. In particular, looking to the function U of the constraint (28), if
U(ρ) = 0 for ρ ≥ ρmax (the maximal mass), then the only admissible velocity is
u = 0 and so no agents can move: the edge is fully congested. Actually, here we
have assumed that U(ρ) > 0 for all ρ, and this fact was useful, for example, to
prove that t 7→ τ(t, e, ρe) is strictly increasing. However, we somehow get that
fully congested property when U(ρmax) is sufficiently small in such a way that, if
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ρe ∼ ρmax in the time interval [t, T ], then τ(t, e, ρe) > T and so the agents do not
move.
5. Conclusions. In this paper we have modelled the agents flows over a trans-
portation network via a mean field game model which also takes into account the
agents’ preferences about the paths choice. We proved the existence of a mean
field equilibrium, and also addressed the case where the set of admissible controls
depends on the actual congestion of the edge.
Future research may be to study the behaviour of the mean field equilibrium by
varying the noise to which the information on the congestion is subject and also
to compare our mean field model with the Wardrop one, with also some possible
numerical simulations. Also the effects of the only estimated flows assumption (12)
on the discrepancy from a real model is worth analyzing.
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